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Paper for discussion Introduction 
The agriculture sector in Indonesia is experiencing a major 
transition. While the Indonesian population increased from 
206 to 237 million people in the period from 2000 to 2010, 
the number of smallholders decreased from 31 million 
in 2003 to 26 million in 2013 (BPS 2014). One important 
trend that may affect agricultural sector development is 
the increasing share of older people who are smallholders. 
The 2013 agricultural census  shows that about 12% of 
smallholders in Indonesia are aged above 65 years, and 
60% of the smallholders are above 45 years old (BPS 2014). 
There are indications that older people will remain in the 
agricultural sector, as younger people tend to move out 
to other sectors. Smallholders are aging, and younger 
people are not interested in farming. The challenge for the 
Government of Indonesia is to formulate policy options 
to encourage the next generation of smallholders to stay 
in the agriculture sector (Ngadi 2014). There are some 
notable exceptions. For example, in the oil palm sector, the 
profitability of the crops has attracted new smallholders 
to cultivate the crop, either by opening new land or 
converting existing crops into oil palm (Feintrenie et al. 
2010). Crops with strong export orientation, such as coffee 
and cocoa, may follow similar trends.
Young people are not interested in the agricultural sector 
because smallholder agriculture is perceived to produce 
a low income due to low productivity. Smallholder 
agriculture has low productivity because of a lack of good 
planting materials and other inputs, and poor agricultural 
practices (Sahara et al. 2017). Smallholders require capital 
for clearing or preparing the land, planting, maintaining, 
harvesting and marketing their products. Smallholders 
cultivating estate crops have an additional challenge, as 
they have to wait for some years before starting to receive 
income from their harvest.
Many smallholders do not have proper documentation 
of their land ownership. They only hold a letter from 
the village head as their proof of ownership of a plot. 
Some of them acquire their lands through informal land 
transactions. They also find that the procedure for land 
certification and transactions is too complicated (Pramudya 
et al. 2017). The existing loan system creates challenges in 
terms of loan maturity. On the other hand, informal and 
traditional financing sources provide credit with more 
relaxed conditions than those imposed by banks and other 
formal financial institutions. Some credit comes from family, 
agricultural input sellers or buyers of agricultural products. 
However, they can only provide small loans and impose 
high interest rates (Nugroho et al. 2013, Sahara et al. 2017).
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Banks and other formal financial institutions are not interested 
in financing smallholders. The agricultural sector is seen as 
high risk for nonperforming loans, as production and prices 
are volatile (Bank Indonesia 2005, Bank Indonesia 2016). 
Agricultural production cycles are not in line with banking 
cycles that could affect repayment of the loan. Banks also 
see that smallholders have small plots, which increases the 
transaction costs for the banks if smallholders are served 
individually (Bank Indonesia 2016).
Another challenge that the smallholders face is an increasing 
demand for commodities that are produced in sustainable 
manner. Consumers in importing countries are demanding 
commodities that comply with environmental, social and 
governance standards. On the other hand, the Government 
of Indonesia has taken up financing as a means to support 
sustainability through the issuance of the Financial Service 
Authority (Otoritas Jasa Keuangan; OJK) regulation on 
sustainable financing, which requires banks and financial 
service providers to apply sustainable financing principles in 
their operations.1
Smallholders’ land ownership and cultivation processes 
are undocumented. Smallholders also have to pay high 
certification costs periodically to maintain their certificates 
(Hidayat et al. 2016). With these challenges, smallholders are 
at risk of being left out of commodity production because 
they cannot comply with sustainability certification. Many 
success stories of smallholders that are able to comply with 
sustainable standards show heavy reliance on external 
support from government, donors or companies. Whether the 
smallholders can go beyond the first round of certification will 
determine the real capacity of smallholders to be part of the 
certification system.
New generation of financing 
schemes
While there are many studies on the challenges smallholders 
face in accessing financial services, there are not as many 
studies on the borrowing behavior of smallholders and 
their attitude toward risks. One lesson from the government 
smallholder timber plantation program was that smallholders 
were not interested in standardized loans because the 
scheme did not match the amounts that smallholders are 
willing to borrow (Nugroho et al. 2013). Understanding 
smallholders’ borrowing behavior would help banks and other 
financial service providers to design financing schemes that 
adapt to the smallholders’ needs and take into account their 
risk profiles.
The understanding that lack of a land title can limit 
smallholders’ access to credit has led to land titling programs 
1 OJK Regulation Number 51/POJK.03/2017 on the application 
of sustainable financing for financial service providers, issuers and 
public companies.
in a number of countries. However, the result of these 
programs varies. Perceptions are changing and lending 
agencies no longer see land titles as collateral in terms 
of their value, but rather as a signal about the borrowers’ 
capacity to repay the loan. Therefore, lending agencies look 
at other factors beyond land title. This leads to the conclusion 
that land titling alone will not be sufficient to solve 
smallholders’ lack of access to credit (Domeher and Abdulai 
2012, Dower and Potamites 2014).
There are various sources of smallholder financing that can 
be categorized by the type of lender (Nugroho et al. 2013, 
Pramudya et al. 2017, Sahara et al. 2017, Wulandari et al. 2017). 
There are three types of financing: (1) formal banking sector; 
(2) formal non-banking sector; (3) informal lending. Formal 
banking lending includes, among others, loans from the 
commercial bank and rural credit banks. Formal non-banking 
lending includes corporate social responsibility programs, 
microfinance agencies and cooperatives. Informal lending 
includes lending from family and trading partners (suppliers 
and buyers) (Nugroho et al. 2013). Government lending lies 
in formal lending, although there are variations between 
banking-connected loans (e.g. the People Business Credit 
[Kredit Usaha Rakyat; KUR]), and government-executed loans 
(e.g. loan by the Forest Development Financing Center [Pusat 
Pembiayaan Pembangunan Hutan; PPPH]). Public sector 
financing is limited by budget and scope (Sahara et al. 2017).
Smallholders who have proper documents and records can 
access credit through formal banking lending. They can apply 
for both investment credit (for establishment) and working 
capital credit (for operation and maintenance). Among them, 
smallholders that are tied to companies (e.g. those under 
plasma schemes in the oil palm sector) have an advantage 
compared to independent smallholders because they receive 
guidance and facilitation from the companies. Independent 
smallholders receive lower output prices, they have to apply 
for the loan individually and they have higher production 
risks, as their products might be declined due to quality 
(Sahara et al. 2017).
There has been an increasing trend in digital technologies 
for financing that have the potential to address smallholders’ 
needs. These include peer-to-peer financing and balance-
sheet financing. In peer-to-peer financing, a service provider 
connects investors and borrowers. Peer-to-peer financing 
providers have field staff that assess the credit worthiness 
of borrowers and score credit based on their assessment. 
The service providers present the credit score to potential 
investors. Once the investor (individual or institutional) 
chooses to invest in a borrower, the investor places the 
money into an escrow account to ensure that the provider 
does not misuse the money. Providers are increasingly 
using digital technologies to monitor the progress of loan 
repayments, and use the data to improve the accuracy of the 
credit scoring. Meanwhile, in balance-sheet financing, the 
provider acts as lender, and the investor invests their money 
in the service provider. In this case, it acts more like formal 
non-bank lending scheme but with different technologies 
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(Pratama 2016). Peer-to-peer financing and balance-sheet 
financing are increasingly popular, and are regulated by OJK. 
By mid-October 2017, there were 24 registered companies 
under the supervision of OJK.2
Another financing scheme that may be suitable for 
smallholders is a lending model without collateral with 
personal or collective guarantee. For example, PPPH 
provides a scheme to tree-planting smallholders, where 
it makes an agreement with individual households in a 
certain jurisdiction (e.g. village), but it applies a collective 
guarantee, where the whole group must bear any default by 
an individual (Nugroho et al. 2013). Other schemes provide 
health insurance as an add-on to the loan (Sucipto 2017). This 
scheme, on the one hand, shares the risks of an individual 
to a collective, with the expectation that there will be social 
control to ensure that loan is repaid. On the other hand, it is 
not easy to manage, especially where members of the groups 
are of unequal social status.
These financing schemes target informal sector actors. The 
loan process is simpler than the banking sector. Investors 
and borrowers do not have to meet face to face. Transaction 
costs are reduced as the borrower does not have to go to 
the office of the service provider. On the other hand, the loan 
size is currently small, although the OJK regulation set out a 
ceiling of IDR 2 billion per loan (Pratama 2017). However, the 
IDR 2 billion threshold is arguably where most smallholders 
are located in terms of loan size. At the moment, these 
schemes are still emerging in Java and will probably become 
widespread across the country. Most of the borrowers are 
currently small-scale manufacturers and traders. Some 
providers focus on women’s empowerment, and so prioritize 
women borrowers.
Another financing scheme is value-chain financing (Bank 
Indonesia 2016). A study by Bank Indonesia highlights 
some key differences between value-chain financing and 
conventional financing. For example, the financing principle 
in value-chain financing is a cooperation or partnership 
contract, while, in conventional financing, it is based on 
the needs of the borrower (i.e. smallholders). In value-chain 
financing, the contract can be used as collateral, while 
conventional financing requires the borrower’s assets as 
collateral. This implies that value-chain financing shares the 
risks between the lenders and borrowers, while conventional 
financing puts the risk on each of the parties (Bank 
Indonesia 2016). This scheme has been widely introduced 
by commercial banks to their corporate clients, and has 
been tested in food and horticultural crops. The nucleus 
plasma scheme in estate crops might adopt some of the 
characteristics of value-chain financing, where banks provide 
loans to smallholders through cooperatives and smallholders 
repay the loan to the cooperatives, which later repay the loan 
to the banks.
2 https://sikapiuangmu.ojk.go.id/FrontEnd/CMS/Article/10398
What is required for the 
development of business models
The previous sections present two important trajectories. 
First, smallholders could be left out of the agriculture sector 
as available formal financing schemes are not compatible 
with their characteristics. They may have to rely on informal 
financing from families, suppliers, buyers or other informal 
actors, who can provide relatively small loans with high 
interest rates. On the other hand, smallholder agriculture 
is very important in Indonesia in terms of production, as 
arguably most agricultural products in the country are 
produced by smallholders. Therefore, strong commitment 
and efforts by government, donors and the private sector is 
needed to help keep smallholder agriculture alive and attract 
young people to engage in it.
Second, new financing schemes are emerging that could 
address the needs of smallholders. A desirable financing 
scheme for smallholders is the one that can adapt to the 
requirements of smallholder agriculture. At the same 
time, smallholders are seen as informal actors, where their 
individual characteristics are not visible except through their 
products, which could pose a risk for lenders.
Efforts to bridge the gaps require a convergence between 
what various financing schemes can offer and what 
smallholders need to change. On one hand, banks or other 
financial service providers could re-evaluate their risk profile 
in order to incorporate more smallholders into their credit 
portfolios. On the other hand, smallholders should start to 
make their individual or household characteristics visible 
by, for example, clarifying their land titling and recording 
their practices (Sahara et al. 2017). After all, accessing 
credit is a business activity and they should follow proper 
business practices.
The rise of the new models of financing provides new 
opportunities for smallholders to access credit beyond 
the traditional sources of financing. These new schemes 
offer more flexible loan schemes that are closer to the 
smallholders’ requirements. At the same time, while the 
new models do not necessarily require the smallholders to 
provide collateral, smallholders still have to be assessed for 
creditworthiness. In this case, the service providers move 
further by assessing the borrower’s capacity to repay the 
loan, as well as helping them to adapt to what the service 
providers require in order to start the financing agreement.
The models have not been able to deal with the maturity 
gap and production and price risks. Smallholders cultivating 
food crops have to wait for at least 3 months before harvest, 
and those cultivating estate and tree crops may wait years for 
the first harvest. Smallholders also face production and price 
risks, which will affect their ability to repay the loan. One way 
to cope with the challenge is to establish a contract between 
the smallholders and the buyers (as off-takers) that specifies 
the quantity and the prices, and agree on sharing the risks. 
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The off-takers may lower their risk if they place the initial 
agreement under their corporate social responsibility program 
rather than placing it under their operational expenses.
Government could play a role by looking into establishing 
crop insurance. The Ministry of Agriculture has developed 
insurance for rice and cattle, and provided premium 
subsidies to attract participants (Kementerian Pertanian 2017, 
Kementerian Pertanian 2017). The ministry and its insurance 
company partner have been disseminating information and 
educating smallholders on an insurance scheme that covers 
losses due to natural disasters and (in the case of cattle) due 
to theft. With the crop-based insurance program, it may take a 
while to cover key crops.
Finally, financing schemes should encourage smallholders to 
adopt better social, environmental and governance measures. 
The issue is more relevant to crops that involve potential 
environmental risks with the land preparation process, more 
use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and the cultivation 
of crops that involve social issues. The role of certification is 
to deal with these issues. However, smallholders are either 
not included in the certification because they are explicitly 
exempted, or because the voluntary nature of the certification 
does not punish those who choose not to have their practices 
certified. Again, this requires a convergence between 
certification bodies addressing smallholders’ requirements 
and smallholders improving their practices.
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